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In the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rucho v Common Cause, 
ruling partisan gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable, redistricting commissions 
have never been more important. These commissions remain one of the few methods 
to remove the redistricting process from the hands of self-interested state legisla-
tures. To accomplish this goal, many commissions limit the number of Republicans 
and Democrats who can serve on the commission and bar certain political actors—
such as legislators and party leaders—from serving as commissioners. Although 
likely necessary to ensure redistricting commissions’ independence, these provisions 
burden the First Amendment associational rights of the excluded individuals and 
their political parties. Recent litigation in Michigan has challenged the state’s com-
mission under this theory, setting the stage for other suits to follow. 
These challenges pose several questions. Chief among them is the proper con-
stitutional standard of review to apply when evaluating associational-rights claims 
against redistricting commissions. Associational-rights doctrine provides two con-
flicting options: strict scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s patronage doctrine, or a 
sliding scale under the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, a standard of review often 
used by the courts to evaluate challenges to election laws. Plaintiffs challenging their 
exclusion from these commissions will likely argue for strict scrutiny, while defend-
ers of redistricting commissions will argue for the more deferential sliding-scale 
scrutiny. This Comment sets out to resolve this dilemma. I evaluate the arguments 
for applying both strict scrutiny and Anderson-Burdick to First Amendment chal-
lenges to redistricting commissions, concluding that—both for doctrinal and nor-
mative reasons—Anderson-Burdick should apply. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the battle against partisan gerrymandering, redistricting 
commissions are now on the front lines. In the 2019 case Rucho v 
Common Cause,1 the Supreme Court held that claims of partisan 
gerrymandering are nonjusticiable under the political question 
doctrine, effectively removing any federal judicial oversight over 
 
 1 139 S Ct 2484 (2019). 
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the mapmaking process.2 By doing so, the Rucho decision has left 
the job to other nonpartisan checks.3 In its opinion, the Court ref-
erenced alternatives to remove partisan influence in the redis-
tricting process, including state court challenges,4 new state gov-
ernmental positions tasked with drawing maps,5 and 
independent redistricting commissions.6 Of these options, redis-
tricting commissions have gained significant traction in recent 
years. A redistricting commission generally consists of a body re-
moved from the state legislature that draws district lines for fed-
eral and state legislative seats. Many states have already estab-
lished some form of these commissions in an attempt to 
decrease the influence of potentially self-interested legislators 
and to reduce partisan gerrymandering.7 
Like every aspect of the redistricting process, these commis-
sions have proved controversial.8 Recently, several individuals 
and a political party have challenged certain provisions of Michi-
gan’s redistricting commission as a violation of their First 
Amendment associational rights.9 The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that freedom of speech also protects a right of expres-
sive association, as association with groups allows individuals to 
express and advance their ideas.10 This right is particularly sali-
ent in the context of association with political parties. Provisions 
of redistricting commissions that bar certain classes of people 
from serving as commissioners, such as legislators and party em-
ployees, can potentially burden this right of political association. 
 
 2 See id at 2506–07. 
 3 State courts, for example, remain a forum for challenging partisan district maps. 
See, for example, Common Cause v Lewis, 2019 WL 4569584, *108–24 (NC Super) (holding 
that North Carolina’s 2017 district maps, the same as those at issue in Rucho, were un-
constitutional under several provisions of the state’s constitution). 
 4 See Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2507 (“Provisions in state statutes and state constitutions 
can provide standards and guidance for state courts to apply.”). 
 5 See id (“Voters [in Missouri] overwhelmingly approved the creation of a new posi-
tion—state demographer—to draw state legislative district lines.”). 
 6 See id (“States are restricting partisan considerations in districting through legis-
lation. One way they are doing so is by placing power to draw electoral districts in the 
hands of independent commissions.”). 
 7 See Number of States Using Redistricting Commissions Growing (Associated 
Press, Mar 21, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/VKD3-H4CY. 
 8 See Andrew Prokop, Are There Reforms That Can Prevent Gerrymandering? (Vox, 
Nov 14, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/BV43-VUES. 
 9 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Daunt v Benson, No 19-cv-
00614, *3–4 (WD Mich filed July 30, 2019) (Daunt Complaint); Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief, Michigan Republican Party v Benson, No 19-cv-00669, *3 (WD Mich 
filed Aug 22, 2019) (Rep Party Complaint). 
 10 See NAACP v Alabama, 357 US 449, 460–61 (1958) (collecting cases). 
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The cases in Michigan—and the potential for others to fol-
low—prompt several questions that the federal courts will need 
to consider. The central question that arises is the appropriate 
standard for evaluating constitutional challenges to redistricting 
commissions. In these cases, plaintiffs and defendants will likely 
argue for differing constitutional standards. Plaintiffs will likely 
demand strict scrutiny, as the challengers in Michigan have. 
Strict scrutiny requires the associational burdens of redistricting 
commissions to be justified by a compelling state interest and to 
be narrowly tailored to that end.11 Defendants, however, will 
likely argue that the court should apply a different constitutional 
standard: Anderson-Burdick sliding-scale scrutiny. 
First outlined by the Supreme Court in Anderson v Cele-
brezze12 and Burdick v Takushi,13 the Anderson-Burdick test ap-
plies to various subsets of election law. Under Anderson-Burdick, 
the level of scrutiny that an election law receives depends on the 
severity of the burden imposed, resulting in a more deferential 
standard for less burdensome laws.14 Strict scrutiny would almost 
certainly lead courts to invalidate redistricting commissions—or 
at least their key provisions—while Anderson-Burdick would 
likely allow a court to find the provisions constitutional.15 This 
question has already caused vexation in the Michigan litigation. 
In an opinion denying a motion for preliminary injunction, a ma-
jority of the Sixth Circuit panel held that Anderson-Burdick 
would likely apply, and thus the plaintiffs would likely fail on the 
merits,16 while an opinion concurring in the judgment thoroughly 
criticized the majority’s decision to apply sliding-scale scrutiny.17 
With the next redistricting cycle quickly approaching after 
completion of the 2020 Census, resolving this question may deter-
mine whether redistricting commissions will be able to properly 
carry out their duties this decade. Additionally, delineating a con-
stitutional standard will not only provide courts with a method 
for deciding the current constitutional challenges to redistricting 
commissions, but will also provide a framework to use going for-
ward. Given the relative nascency of redistricting commissions, 
new variations on current commissions are likely to emerge to 
 
 11 See Rutan v Republican Party, 497 US 62, 74 (1990). 
 12 460 US 780 (1983). 
 13 504 US 428 (1992). 
 14 See id at 434. 
 15 See Part V. 
 16 See Daunt v Benson, 956 F3d 396, 406–08 (6th Cir 2020). 
 17 See id at 422–27 (Readler concurring in the judgment). 
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achieve the ultimate goal of creating nonpartisan electoral dis-
tricts. Although this Comment evaluates associational claims 
against current provisions, the constitutional standard I propose 
here should be applicable in all future First Amendment associa-
tional challenges to redistricting commissions, regardless of what 
provisions are challenged. 
This Comment evaluates both strict scrutiny and Anderson-
Burdick as possible standards for judging challenges to independ-
ent redistricting commissions and concludes that the Anderson-
Burdick test should be extended to these cases. Part I provides an 
overview of gerrymandering and redistricting commissions and 
details the provisions of redistricting commissions that can be 
challenged using a First Amendment associational-rights theory. 
Part II explains the two lines of cases that suggest either strict 
scrutiny or the Anderson-Burdick framework should apply to 
First Amendment challenges to redistricting commissions. 
Part III evaluates the doctrinal case for applying each standard 
to redistricting commissions and concludes that the balance tips 
toward applying Anderson-Burdick. Part IV supplements the doc-
trinal rationale for Anderson-Burdick with a normative justifica-
tion for applying sliding-scale scrutiny to redistricting commis-
sions. In contrast with strict scrutiny, the Anderson-Burdick test 
gives courts more flexibility to consider the severity of associa-
tional injuries against states’ constitutional interest in regulating 
elections and gives redistricting commissions—one of the few re-
maining solutions to partisan gerrymandering—greater legal 
protection. Finally, Part V examines how a court might evaluate 
challenges to redistricting commissions under Anderson-Burdick, 
concluding that they should survive review under this standard. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS AND THEIR 
CONSTITUTIONALLY CHALLENGEABLE PROVISIONS 
A. Partisan Gerrymandering and the Rise of Redistricting 
Commissions 
The need for redistricting commissions has grown out of the 
increased use and sophistication of partisan gerrymandering by 
legislatures throughout the United States. As a general matter, 
partisan gerrymandering occurs when legislators draw electoral 
1850 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1845 
 
district lines for political advantage.18 Normally, this is done by 
the majority party in the state legislature, which “packs” large 
populations of opposition voters into certain districts and then 
“cracks” the rest into minorities in the remaining districts, effec-
tively ensuring that the majority party earns a majority of seats 
disproportionate to their vote share in an election.19 This can oc-
cur for federal congressional districts, state legislative districts, 
and even municipal districts. 
Concerns over this sort of abuse from incumbent legislators 
date back to the early days of the United States. The term “gerry-
mander,” in fact, first appeared in an 1812 newspaper criticizing 
the Massachusetts redistricting process under Governor Elbridge 
Gerry, claiming one of the new districts resembled a salaman-
der.20 However, concerns over partisan gerrymanders have in-
creased significantly in recent decades because of how easy they 
have become to create.21 Advances in mapping technologies have 
made gerrymandering effortless and precise. Mapmakers can 
now generate maps optimizing outcomes for their preferred polit-
ical party while adhering to traditional redistricting criteria,22 
such as compactness and contiguity.23 
The results of these technological advances have been dra-
matic in many states. The maps considered in Rucho show a strik-
ing example: the challenged map in North Carolina gave Repub-
licans ten of the thirteen congressional seats, while Maryland’s 
map gave Democrats control of seven of eight districts.24 For con-
text, then-candidate Donald Trump won 49.8 percent of the vote 
in North Carolina in the 2016 presidential election, while former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton won 60.3 percent of the vote in 
Maryland in the same election.25 These distorted maps not only 
 
 18 See Black’s Law Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019) (defining “Gerrymandering” as 
“[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly irreg-
ular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s 
voting strength”). 
 19 Justin Levitt, A Citizen’s Guide to Redistricting 57–58 (Brennan Center for Jus-
tice 2010). 
 20 See Allen Pusey, A Move Toward ‘1 Person, 1 Vote’, 104 ABA J 72, 72 (Feb 2018). 
 21 See Vann R. Newkirk II, How Redistricting Became a Technological Arms Race 
(The Atlantic, Oct 28, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/KRR8-V6C5 (detailing the his-
tory of technology use in redistricting and its advancement over the last few election cycles). 
 22 See id. 
 23 National Conference of State Legislatures, Redistricting Criteria (Apr 23, 2019), 
archived at https://perma.cc/A4GU-C23P. 
 24 See Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2491–93. 
 25 See Presidential Election Results: Donald J. Trump Wins (NY Times, Aug 9, 2017), 
archived at https://perma.cc/C4RV-L5GK. 
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waste votes of the minority party and damage proportionality be-
tween representation and support,26 they also can impact the 
democratic process itself. Gerrymandered districts likely increase 
ideological polarization in legislatures, as packed districts become 
easy wins for the majority party in general elections. This leads 
to more competitive party primaries and more ideological candi-
dates, as candidates must appeal to the more extreme party base 
instead of the ideological center in a general election.27 This can 
in turn lead to increased gridlock in the legislative process be-
cause more extreme legislators are less likely to compromise.28 
Less competitive elections can also decrease voter turnout, as 
many citizens will see the election results as predetermined.29 
The federal courts were long seen as a vehicle for combatting 
partisan gerrymandering and its ill effects. The Supreme Court, 
however, struggled over several decades to deliver a judicially 
manageable standard to resolve constitutional claims against the 
practice. In Davis v Bandemer,30 the Court first attempted to set 
out a standard.31 However, lower court difficulties in applying the 
standard caused the Court to reverse course eighteen years later 
in Vieth v Jubelirer,32 in which a plurality declared partisan ger-
rymandering claims nonjusticiable.33 Only Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy’s concurrence—which left open the possibility of discovering 
a workable standard—provided hope that federal courts would 
 
 26 All elections have wasted votes—that is, all votes cast for the losing candidate in 
an election and all votes cast for the winner above the electoral threshold. Partisan gerry-
manders decrease the number of wasted votes for the party the gerrymander favors. One 
of the best methods of measuring the disproportionality of a wasted vote due to partisan 
gerrymandering is the “efficiency gap,” which is simply calculated by subtracting one 
party’s wasted votes from the other and dividing by the total number of votes cast. The 
higher the number, the greater the efficiency gap. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos and 
Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U Chi L Rev 831, 
849–55 (2015). Based on this metric, the gerrymanders of the 2010 redistricting cycle were 
the worst in modern history. See id at 876. 
 27 See Nathan S. Catanese, Note, Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazard-
ous Impact of Partisan Redistricting, 28 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Pub Pol 323, 339 (2014) 
(explaining that more competitive primaries yield more ideologically extreme general elec-
tion candidates). 
 28 See id at 331–33. 
 29 See id at 340–41. 
 30 478 US 109 (1986). 
 31 See id at 132 (White) (plurality) (deeming an electoral system unlawful if “ar-
ranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence 
on the political process as a whole”). 
 32 541 US 267 (2004). 
 33 See id at 305 (Scalia) (plurality). 
1852 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1845 
 
adjudicate these claims.34 Rucho finally shut the door and re-
moved the federal courts from the fight by declaring all partisan 
gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable.35 
Consequently, redistricting commissions now remain one of 
the few options left to fight against partisan gerrymandering. Alt-
hough now at the forefront, the proliferation of redistricting com-
missions occurred long before Rucho. Arkansas created the first 
commission in 1956 and a few states followed suit. But the major-
ity of commissions have been established since 1990.36 At the 
same time, scholars began to see redistricting commissions as a 
feasible method to eliminate partisan gerrymandering.37 Michi-
gan became the most recent state to join the club, establishing an 
independent commission via ballot initiative in 2018, while Colo-
rado replaced its old partisan commission with an independent 
commission in the same year.38 
This proliferation has not necessarily indicated stability; some 
of these commissions have recently seen constitutional challenges 
levied against them from different groups. Those established 
through citizen ballot initiatives came under scrutiny in the 2015 
case Arizona State Legislature v Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission.39 In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of this method of creating redistricting commis-
sions.40 In doing so, the Court interpreted the Elections Clause41 of 
the US Constitution to include the people as part of the Arizona 
“Legislature,” giving the people the power to determine the 
 
 34 See id at 313–14 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment). 
 35 See Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2506–07. 
 36 National Conference of State Legislatures, Creation of Redistricting Commissions: 
Background (Apr 6, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/J5ZS-BH6H. 
 37 See Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 Tex L Rev 
837, 840–55 (1997) (providing an overview of scholarship on redistricting commissions and 
their effectiveness). 
 38 See Creation of Redistricting Commissions (cited in note 36). Missouri added an 
alternative nonpartisan check on gerrymandering in a 2018 ballot initiative: an independ-
ent state demographer tasked with drawing legislative maps. Republicans legislators in 
Missouri have aimed to repeal this position through a new ballot initiative, however. See 
Jason Hancock, Repeal of Voter-Approved Redistricting Plan Heads to Ballot After Mis-
souri House Vote (Kansas City Star, May 13, 2020), available online at https://www 
.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article242701011.html (visited July 28, 2020) 
(Perma archive unavailable). 
 39 135 S Ct 2652 (2015). 
 40 See id at 2677. 
 41 US Const Art I, § 4, cl 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof.”). 
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methods of redistricting.42 This cleared the way for Michigan and 
Colorado to establish their commissions through public referen-
dum, allowing them to circumvent the state legislature. 
This decision did not put redistricting commissions entirely 
in the clear, however. In the summer of 2019, litigants filed two 
constitutional challenges to Michigan’s independent redistricting 
commission. Both challenge the commission’s prohibition on cer-
tain political actors—including legislators, party insiders, and 
lobbyists—serving as commissioners. The first suit, filed by indi-
vidual plaintiffs who fall into the prohibited categories, chal-
lenges the commission as a violation of their First Amendment 
associational rights to be free from political discrimination in gov-
ernment employment decisions.43 The second, filed by the Michi-
gan Republican Party, challenges the commission as a violation 
of its associational rights to choose its own members, since the 
commission requires applicants to self-identify as either Republi-
can, Democratic, or unaffiliated.44 The Western District of Michi-
gan has now consolidated these two cases into the ongoing litiga-
tion of Daunt v Benson.45 Although the Sixth Circuit recently 
affirmed a lower court’s denial of a preliminary injunction in this 
case46 and the Western District subsequently granted the defend-
ant’s motion to dismiss,47 the suit may be far from over, with fur-
ther appeals and litigation possible. 
These suits likely represent the first of many against redis-
tricting commissions on similar grounds. As discussed in the fol-
lowing Section, other commissions have similar provisions that 
bar certain interested parties from serving as commissioners. 
With the upcoming redistricting cycle in 2021, these challenges 
will serve as test cases for plaintiffs to consider future litigation 
against other redistricting commissions throughout the country. 
Many challengers will likely argue—as the Daunt plaintiffs do48—
that these provisions are inseverable from the commissions as a 
 
 42 See Arizona State Legislature, 135 S Ct at 2671–77. 
 43 See Daunt Complaint at *3 (cited in note 9). 
 44 See Rep Party Complaint at *3, 12 (cited in note 9). The terminology varies re-
garding unaffiliated persons. For the sake of simplicity, I will use “unaffiliated” to refer to 
redistricting commission members that are not members of either the Republican or Dem-
ocratic Party. 
 45 See Order Granting Motion to Consolidate Cases, Daunt v Benson, No 1:19-cv-
00614, *2–3 (WD Mich filed Sept 11, 2019) (Consolidation Order). 
 46 See Daunt, 956 F3d at 422. 
 47 Daunt v Benson, No 19-cv-00614, slip op at 34 (WD Mich July 6, 2020). 
 48 See Daunt Complaint at *22–26 (cited in note 9). 
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whole. If successful, the commissions could cease to exist at the 
one time in this decade when their services are needed. To comply 
with constitutional standards, every state with more than one 
congressional seat usually redistricts after each national census 
is completed.49 Most states only redistrict every ten years in com-
pliance with this constitutional minimum, making redistricting 
commissions obsolete if they do not function during the redistrict-
ing cycle.50 Even if severable, removing these provisions from re-
districting commissions could impair the commissions’ ability to 
create unbiased, nonpartisan district maps. The following Section 
will introduce these provisions and explain how they function to 
remove partisan influence from the mapmaking process. 
B. Structure of Redistricting Commissions and Challengeable 
Provisions 
Redistricting commissions exist in various forms throughout 
the country. All commissions consist of a certain number of com-
missioners tasked with the creation of district maps, often with 
the aid of experts, technology, and other outside resources.51 Com-
missions fall mainly into four distinct categories: advisory, 
backup, politician, and independent.52 Advisory commissions as-
sist in drawing legislative districts but leave the final decision to 
the state legislature.53 Backup commissions only step in to draw 
district lines if the state legislature fails to do so in the required 
time.54 Politician commissions actually remove redistricting 
power from state legislatures, but are comprised of individual leg-
islators as well as various other state political actors.55 In Ohio, 
for example, the governor, auditor of state, secretary of state, and 
 
 49 See Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 583–84 (1964) (“While we do not intend to indi-
cate that decennial reapportionment is a constitutional requisite . . . if reapportionment 
were accomplished with less frequency, it would assuredly be constitutionally suspect.”). 
 50 However, nothing prohibits states from redistricting more frequently. Some states 
do so, often for partisan advantage. See generally, for example, League of United Latin 
American Citizens v Perry, 548 US 399 (2006) (evaluating a Republican-led redistricting 
in Texas three years after the state redistricted under the 2000 Census). 
 51 See, for example, Mich Const Art IV, § 6(5) (requiring the Michigan Legislature to 
apportion funds to their independent redistricting commission to “carry out its functions, 
operations and activities, which activities include retaining independent, nonpartisan 
subject-matter experts and legal counsel”). 
 52 See Levitt, Guide to Redistricting at 20–22 (cited in note 19). 
 53 See id at 20. See also, for example, Iowa Code § 42.3. 
 54 See Levitt, Guide to Redistricting at 21 (cited in note 19). See also, for example, Ill 
Const Art IV, § 3(b). 
 55 See Levitt, Guide to Redistricting at 21 (cited in note 19). 
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four commissioners chosen by the majority and minority party 
leaders in the state legislative houses draw the state district 
maps.56 Independent commissions—as their name suggests—at-
tempt to entirely remove partisan influence from the redistricting 
process. These commissions attempt to eliminate political moti-
vations by barring legislators and other partisan actors from serv-
ing on the commission.57 
Despite the differences in commission structures across 
states, almost all share provisions that potentially burden First 
Amendment associational rights. Two provisions pose a particu-
larly high risk of provoking lawsuits: (1) provisions that prohibit 
certain political actors—such as legislators, party insiders, and 
lobbyists—from serving on the commission; and (2) provisions 
that impose quotas or require persons with certain political affil-
iations to serve on the commission. Individuals can challenge both 
requirements as impermissible burdens on political association 
because of the political considerations needed to select commis-
sioners. Political parties—if they have no say in the selection pro-
cess—can argue that both provisions burden their First Amend-
ment right to determine who associates with them.58 
Independent commissions, unsurprisingly, are the most 
likely to include exclusionary provisions and therefore face con-
stitutional challenges. Eight states currently have independent 
redistricting commissions: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Idaho, Michigan, Montana, and Washington.59 Some of these com-
missions still allow the legislature to select commissioners,60 but 
others consist of members selected from a pool of registered voters 
who apply to serve on the commission.61 All of them, however, 
have restrictions on legislators and political actors serving on the 
 
 56 See Ohio Const Art XI, § 1(A). 
 57 See Levitt, Guide to Redistricting at 22 (cited in note 19). See also, for example, 
Mich Const Art IV, § 6(1)(b)–(c). 
 58 Both these lines of reasoning are present in the consolidated Daunt suit. See 
Daunt Complaint at *3 (cited in note 9) (making individual associational claims against 
exclusionary provisions of Michigan’s redistricting commission); Rep Party Complaint at 
*3 (cited in note 9) (making party claims against the exclusionary provisions and the re-
quirements of certain political affiliation on the Michigan commission). 
 59 See Common Cause, Independent and Advisory Citizen Redistricting Commis-
sions, archived at https://perma.cc/ED6W-9KUC. Utah currently has an independent ad-
visory commission, but since the legislature must approve all maps, this committee is not 
included here. 
 60 See, for example, Mont Const Art V, § 14(2) (“The majority and minority leaders 
of each house shall each designate one commissioner.”). 
 61 See, for example, Mich Const Art IV, § 6(2) (detailing the application and selection 
process for serving on the Michigan commission). 
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commission.62 For example, the Michigan commission—the target 
of the first constitutional challenge along these lines in Daunt—
bars commissioners that fall into several specific categories, includ-
ing: “a declared candidate for” or an “elected official to” partisan 
office; an officer of a political party; a consultant or employee of a 
political campaign or political action committee; a state-registered 
lobbyist; or a close relative or spouse of someone who falls into any 
of these categories.63 Although these provisions are most common 
among independent redistricting commissions, other types of 
commissions sometimes also exclude political actors.64 
Provisions that impose quotas or require persons with certain 
political association are slightly less common among redistricting 
commissions. These provisions normally require a certain num-
ber of Democrats, Republicans, and/or unaffiliated voters to serve 
on the commission. As an example, Michigan’s commission con-
sists of thirteen members chosen semi-randomly from a pool of 
applicants of the state’s registered voters, subject to certain ra-
tios.65 Four commissioners must be voters who identify with the 
largest party in the legislature, four more must affiliate with the 
second largest party, and the final five must identify as unaffili-
ated with either major party.66 Although not explicit in the text, 
this acts as a de facto requirement for four Democrats and four 
Republicans on the commission. Of particular concern for Michi-
gan’s susceptibility to suit, party affiliation is not determined 
through voter registration or party records. Instead, applicants 
must only attest under oath that they associate with a certain 
 
 62 See Alaska Const Art VI, § 8(a) (barring “public employees or officials”); Ariz Const 
Art IV, Part 2, § 3 (barring candidates for or holders of public office, officers of a political 
party, paid lobbyists, or officers of a campaign committee for at least three years); Cal 
Govt Code § 8252(a)(2)(A) (barring elected public officials, candidates for public office, em-
ployees or consultants of political campaigns or parties, registered lobbyists, or significant 
campaign donors for ten years); Colo Const Art V, § 47(2)(c)(I), (III) (barring General As-
sembly members and candidates for five years and other elected public officials for three 
years); Idaho Const Art III, § 2(2) (barring current elected or appointed public officials); 
Mich Const Art IV, § 6(1)(b)–(c) (barring candidates and holders of public office, lobbyists, 
officers of political parties, employees of campaigns and political action committees, and 
close relatives of someone belonging to any of these categories); Mont Const Art V, § 14(2) 
(barring all public officials); Wash Const Art II, § 43(3) (barring elected officials for two 
years). 
 63 See Mich Const Art IV, § 6(1)(b)–(c). 
 64 See, for example, Iowa Code § 42.5(2) (requiring that no member of Iowa’s advisory 
commission be someone who “[h]olds partisan public office or political party office” or a 
close relative or employee of someone belonging to these categories). 
 65 See Mich Const Art IV, § 6(1)–(2). 
 66 See Mich Const Art IV, § 6(2)(a)(iii), (f). 
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party or consider themselves unaffiliated.67 Without more cer-
tainty from prior documentation of political association, political 
parties have a stronger claim that selected commissioners do not 
represent their interests and deprive them of their right to choose 
their members. 
Other independent commissions, including those in Califor-
nia and Colorado, have similar provisions in which commission-
ers with certain political affiliations are chosen randomly or by 
an independent body.68 California’s commission would have a 
stronger defense against a party associational claim because its 
commissioners must be registered with their designated political 
party.69 Colorado remains more vulnerable, as it only requires a 
nonpartisan staff to review applications attesting to political af-
filiation.70 Many other states with both independent and nonin-
dependent commissions also have requirements for commission-
ers from each party.71 However, these states allow 
representatives in the state legislature to choose commissioners, 
likely undercutting an associational claim from political parties.72 
Of course, because these quotas still require the selecting body to 
consider political affiliation, they could still be subject to an indi-
vidual associational claim. 
Although not all redistricting commissions contain these ex-
clusionary provisions, many see such provisions as essential to 
creating truly independent redistricting commissions and elimi-
nating partisan gerrymandering. Voters Not Politicians (VNP), 
the group behind the ballot initiative establishing Michigan’s in-
dependent redistricting commission, argues that the provisions 
are necessary to exclude commissioners who are “most likely to 
have a conflict of interest” in the redistricting process.73 Regard-
ing the quotas for certain numbers of partisans, VNP explains 
that these provisions help create consensus and ensure that the 
 
 67 See Mich Const Art IV, § 6(2)(a)(iii) (describing what plaintiffs must attest to un-
der oath). 
 68 See Cal Const Art XXI, § 2(c)(2); Colo Const Art 5, § 44.1(10). 
 69 See Cal Const Art XXI, § 2(c)(2). 
 70 See Colo Const Art 5, § 44.1(6). 
 71 See, for example, Ariz Const Art IV, Part 2, § 1(3) (“No more than two members of 
the independent redistricting commission shall be members of the same political party.”). 
 72 See, for example, Ariz Const Art IV, Part 2, § 1(6) (requiring that the majority and 
minority leaders of both state houses alternate picking candidates from a pool of applicants). 
 73 See Voters Not Politicians, We Ended Gerrymandering in Michigan, archived at 
https://perma.cc/BFN6-88W7. 
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commission acts in a nonpartisan manner.74 Empirical evidence 
backs up these claims. A 2018 survey by the Brennan Center for 
Justice evaluated different redistricting commission variations to 
discover what provisions most effectively reduce abuses in the re-
districting process.75 Among other recommendations, the survey 
found that commissions that “not only screen[ ] applicants for dis-
qualifications or conflicts of interest but also make[ ] qualitative 
assessments about the fitness of applicants to do the job” and com-
missions that “require[ ] that a map obtain at least some support 
from each major political block” maximized effectiveness and 
voter satisfaction.76 
Consequently, removing exclusionary or quota provisions—
whether through the courts or the legislative process—could put 
the efficacy of these commissions at risk. Without these provisions, 
independent commissions could not guarantee that self-interested 
political parties and incumbent legislators would not influence 
the redistricting process. Even worse, a court could find the pro-
visions inseverable from the rest of the commission, eliminating 
the commission entirely from the electoral process. In short, these 
suits threaten some of the foundational commission provisions 
that ensure both an unbiased redistricting process and nonparti-
san electoral maps. 
II.  POTENTIAL STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING REDISTRICTING 
COMMISSIONS’ CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Considering the proliferation of redistricting commissions 
with these provisions, courts will likely see an influx of lawsuits 
challenging their constitutionality under First Amendment asso-
ciational rights from partisan stakeholders wishing to continue 
gerrymandering practices. Although not explicit in the text of the 
First Amendment, courts have long recognized that the Constitu-
tion protects the right of expressive association and that laws bur-
dening this right receive strict scrutiny—the highest level of con-
stitutional review. In NAACP v Alabama,77 the Supreme Court 
first recognized that freedom of speech includes a right to 
 
 74 See Voters Not Politicians, Frequently Asked Questions, archived at 
https://perma.cc/MYE8-KJ6J. 
 75 See Redistricting Commissions: What Works (Brennan Center for Justice, July 24, 
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/7BG9-AR6M. 
 76 Id. 
 77 357 US 449 (1958). 
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associate with groups for expressive purposes.78 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court recognized that “[e]ffective advocacy of both 
public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, 
is undeniably enhanced by group association.”79 According to the 
Court, “it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced 
by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural 
matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing 
the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.”80 
Although associational rights encompass all forms of associ-
ation, a large portion of such cases—and those pertinent to redis-
tricting commissions—deal with political association. Since Wil-
liams v Rhodes,81 the Court has declared unconstitutional many 
government actions that limit individuals’ abilities to join politi-
cal groups or express their association with such groups. In Wil-
liams, this meant eliminating an Ohio law that impaired a new 
political party’s ability to get on the ballot to choose electors.82 In 
other cases, the Court has struck down laws that restricted indi-
viduals’ ability to vote in a party primary83 and restrictions on 
donations to groups formed to advocate for or against a ballot in-
itiative,84 to name a couple. This right of political association not 
only extends to individuals, but also to political parties them-
selves, specifically protecting their ability to choose who associ-
ates with and represents them.85 
In the redistricting commission context, plaintiffs will likely 
push courts to evaluate the challenged provisions under a subset 
of the Supreme Court’s political association doctrine: the “Patron-
age Cases.” Employing these cases would compel a court to apply 
strict scrutiny to redistricting commissions, which would require 
the state to provide a compelling state interest for these provi-
sions and require that the law be narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest. The plaintiffs challenging Michigan’s commission in 
 
 78 See id at 460 (“It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the 
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”). 
 79 See id. 
 80 Id at 460–61. 
 81 393 US 23 (1968). 
 82 See id at 30–34. 
 83 See Kusper v Pontikes, 414 US 51, 56–61 (1973). 
 84 See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v City of Berkeley, 
454 US 290, 295–99 (1981). 
 85 See Cousins v Wigoda, 419 US 477, 487–88 (1975) (holding that a party’s associa-
tional rights allow it to choose the delegates to its national convention). 
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Daunt seek precisely this.86 However, another constitutional 
standard, often used by the courts when evaluating constitutional 
challenges to election laws, arguably controls in these suits 
against redistricting commissions: Anderson-Burdick sliding-
scale scrutiny. Defendants will likely argue that this is the proper 
standard for evaluating constitutional challenges to redistricting 
commissions because of the more lenient review it yields.87 
This Part explores the contours of strict scrutiny under the 
Patronage Cases and of sliding-scale scrutiny under the Anderson-
Burdick doctrine. It also discusses when courts choose to apply 
each. This will lay the groundwork for deciding which should ap-
ply when reviewing redistricting commissions. 
A. The Patronage Cases and First Amendment Strict Scrutiny 
The plaintiffs in Daunt rely on the First Amendment’s Pat-
ronage Cases to argue for strict scrutiny,88 likely framing the ar-
gument for future challenges to similar redistricting commission 
provisions. The Patronage Cases are a colloquial term for three 
Supreme Court cases—Elrod v Burns,89 Branti v Finkel,90 and Ru-
tan v Republican Party of Illinois91—that created a new subset of 
constitutional protections for political associational rights. They 
follow the general mandate that courts must apply strict scrutiny 
to situations in which the government burdens political associa-
tion. Specifically, these cases determined that the consideration 
of political affiliation in employment decisions—potentially anal-
ogous to the restrictive provisions on redistricting commissions 
discussed above—constitute an associational burden, and that 
these burdens in turn fail strict scrutiny. 
This doctrine originates with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Elrod, in which the Court first held that the government cannot 
consider politics in employment termination decisions. When the 
Republican sheriff of Cook County in Illinois was replaced by 
Democrat Richard Elrod in 1970, Elrod fired the plaintiffs—a 
group of non-civil-service employees in the office—for not affiliat-
ing with the Democratic party.92 Writing for a plurality of the 
 
 86 Daunt Complaint at *4 (cited in note 9). 
 87 See Part V. 
 88 Daunt Complaint at *16–21 (cited in note 9). 
 89 427 US 347 (1976). 
 90 445 US 507 (1980). 
 91 497 US 62 (1990). 
 92 See Elrod, 427 US at 351 (Brennan) (plurality). 
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Court, Justice William Brennan recognized that this discharge 
burdened the plaintiffs’ political beliefs and association, which 
Justice Brennan referred to as “the core of those activities pro-
tected by the First Amendment.”93 The decision to terminate 
these employees therefore had to survive “exacting scrutiny.”94 
That is to say, the government had to advance some “paramount” 
interest that overcame the burden on protected rights and that 
was narrowly tailored to the desired end.95 Justice Brennan made 
certain to note that in the instant case of political discrimination, 
“care must be taken not to confuse the interest of partisan organ-
izations with governmental interests.”96 In other words, advanc-
ing the interests of a single political party could never amount to 
a legitimate government interest. 
Applying strict scrutiny to Sheriff Elrod’s termination deci-
sions, Justice Brennan considered and rejected several state in-
terests as insufficiently compelling, including: employee effi-
ciency, public accountability, political loyalty, and preservation of 
the democratic process.97 Specifically regarding the interest in 
preserving the democratic process—a particularly salient interest 
in the context of redistricting commissions—Justice Brennan dis-
missed the idea that reliance on patronage is necessary to a well-
functioning democratic government. While noting that “[p]reser-
vation of the democratic process is certainly an interest . . . which 
may in some instances justify limitations on First Amendment 
freedoms,” he found no justification for thinking that eliminating 
patronage would “bring about the demise of party politics.”98 
Justice Brennan concluded that firing the plaintiffs severely 
burdened their political beliefs and associational rights, and that 
no government interest advanced by the defendants was suffi-
ciently compelling to legitimize them.99 Accordingly, these patron-
age dismissals were unconstitutional under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.100 He made sure to note, however, that this 
 
 93 Id at 356. 
 94 Id at 362. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Elrod, 427 US at 362 (Brennan) (plurality). 
 97 See id at 364–69. 
 98 Id at 368–69. 
 99 See id at 372–73. 
 100 See Elrod, 427 US at 373 (Brennan) (plurality). Most patronage practices violate 
both the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but this is because the Fourteenth Amend-
ment incorporates the First Amendment and applies it against the states. Justice Brennan 
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holding did not apply to policymaking positions, where patronage 
might be necessary to ensure that the will of the public is effec-
tively implemented.101 
The Court did not consider another patronage case until four 
years later in Branti. Accepting the holding of Elrod, the Court 
focused on drawing the line between policymaking and nonpoli-
cymaking positions to further refine the doctrine. The proper in-
quiry for resolving this question, according to the Court, was 
“whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affilia-
tion is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance 
of the public office involved.”102 Applying this formulation, the 
Court determined that assistant public defender jobs were not 
“policymaking” positions, and thus that the plaintiffs’ termina-
tions violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.103 Unlike 
the Court’s previous decision in Elrod, the opinion in this case 
commanded a majority of the Court, solidifying the patronage 
doctrine as good law.104 Its clarification of the policymaking ex-
ception also further refined the doctrine, a distinction that has 
particular importance in fights over redistricting commission-
ers.105 
A decade later, the last in the trilogy of Patronage Cases, Ru-
tan, greatly expanded the doctrine to other employment practices 
beyond terminations, thereby setting the stage for the current set 
of lawsuits against redistricting commissions. The case concerned 
a group of plaintiffs from Illinois, who challenged the governor’s 
use of political considerations in various employment decisions, 
including hiring, promotions, transfers, and layoff recalls.106 The 
defendants attempted to distinguish these employment practices 
from the terminations in Elrod and Branti, but the Court quickly 
rejected this idea.107 Although these were not firings, employees 
still faced negative consequences. Namely, each had to compro-
mise their political beliefs and associational rights to receive an 
 
acknowledged this in Elrod, explaining that “while it is the Fourteenth Amendment which 
bears directly upon the State it is the more specific limiting principles of the First Amend-
ment that finally govern this case.” Id at 356 n 10, quoting Board of Education v Barnette, 
319 US 624, 639 (1943). For simplicity, this Comment will refer to the Patronage Cases as 
applying First Amendment—rather than Fourteenth Amendment—doctrine. 
 101 See Elrod, 427 US at 372 (Brennan) (plurality). 
 102 Branti, 445 US at 518. 
 103 See id at 519–20. 
 104 See generally id. 
 105 See Part III.A.2. 
 106 See Rutan, 497 US at 65–67. 
 107 See id at 71–72. 
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employment benefit (like a promotion) from the government, a 
condition prohibited under the First Amendment.108 Conse-
quently, the decision in Rutan expanded the First Amendment 
prohibition on considerations of party affiliation and support to 
acts of promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring.109 A few years later, 
the Court determined that the First Amendment protections es-
tablished in the Patronage Cases also extended to government 
contractors.110 By prohibiting political considerations in hiring de-
cisions, Rutan paved the way for potential challenges to redis-
tricting commissions. If certain provisions mandate that political 
affiliations are considered when selecting commissioners, these 
provisions could potentially violate the holdings of the Patronage 
Cases. 
B. The Anderson-Burdick Balancing Test for Election Laws 
In contrast to the strict scrutiny demanded by the Patronage 
Cases, supporters of redistricting commissions will likely argue 
that courts should instead apply the Anderson-Burdick balancing 
test to claims brought against redistricting commissions. Instead 
of always demanding a narrowly tailored law furthering a com-
pelling governmental interest, this standard adjusts the level of 
scrutiny based on the severity of the burden. Low burdens on con-
stitutional rights receive relatively little scrutiny, while greater 
burdens require more compelling government interests to sur-
vive. Unlike strict scrutiny and rational basis review,111 which are 
found throughout constitutional law, Anderson-Burdick applies 
only to certain subsets of election laws that burden voting and 
associational rights. 
This standard originated with the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Anderson. Plaintiff John Anderson—an independent candidate 
for president of the United States in the 1980 election—failed to 
appear on the Ohio ballot despite getting the requisite number of 
 
 108 See id at 74. 
 109 See id at 79. 
 110 See O’Hare Truck Service, Inc v City of Northlake, 518 US 712, 721–22 (1996). 
 111 Rational basis review is the most deferential form of constitutional scrutiny courts 
can apply. Under this standard, a law “is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless” it 
cannot be shown that “it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experi-
ence of the legislators.” United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 152 (1938). 
Rational basis review applies to most laws challenged under the Constitution, unless they 
facially implicate “a specific prohibition of the Constitution,” harm specific “political pro-
cesses” like “interferences with political organizations,” or “prejudice [ ] discrete and insu-
lar minorities.” Id at 152 n 4. 
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signatures, as he failed to meet Ohio’s early filing deadline for 
independents.112 In response, Anderson and three voters chal-
lenged the early filing deadline as a violation of their First 
Amendment associational rights.113 
In evaluating this claim, the Court emphasized that these 
kinds of ballot access restrictions not only affect candidates, but 
also burden voters’ constitutional rights.114 Restricting the candi-
dates who appear on the ballot implicates a voter’s right to cast 
their vote effectively and their right to associate with a political 
campaign, which can serve as “an effective platform for the ex-
pression of views” or a “rallying point for like-minded citizens.”115 
Nonetheless, the Court noted that comprehensive regulation of 
elections by the states is necessary to keep them “fair and hon-
est.”116 When scrutinized, essentially every election law “inevita-
bly affects—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote 
and his right to associate.”117 
To solve this inherent dilemma, the Court eschewed the strict 
scrutiny/rational basis review dichotomy that normally charac-
terizes First Amendment evaluations. Instead, when evaluating 
state election laws, a court must “first consider the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments” and then “identify and eval-
uate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifica-
tions for the burden.”118 Only after weighing and comparing these 
factors can a court rule on the constitutionality of the regula-
tion.119 When applying this newly formulated balancing test to the 
Ohio early filing deadline, the Court quickly acknowledged that 
the burden it placed on independent voters was “substantial.”120 
The Court then concluded that none of the interests put forward 
by the government balanced out the infringement on voting and 
associational rights.121 
 
 112 See Anderson, 460 US at 782. 
 113 See id at 783. The plaintiffs also challenged the filing deadline on Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection grounds. See id. That aspect of the case is beyond the scope 
of this Comment. 
 114 See id at 786. 
 115 Id at 787–88. 
 116 Anderson, 460 US at 788. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id at 789. 
 119 See id. 
 120 Anderson, 460 US at 790. 
 121 See id at 806. 
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The other half of the Anderson-Burdick moniker came several 
years later, when the Court considered the case of Burdick and 
solidified the balancing test for certain challenges to election 
laws. The petitioners in Burdick claimed that Hawaii’s prohibi-
tion on write-in voting violated their First Amendment associa-
tional rights.122 The Court reaffirmed the special interest that 
states have in regulating their elections, stating that this interest 
derives not only from necessity and common sense, but also from 
the Elections Clause of the Constitution.123 Accordingly, strict 
scrutiny is inappropriate for cases challenging election laws un-
der the First Amendment and the “more flexible standard” laid 
out in Anderson controls instead.124 The Court also clarified the 
test, stating that “the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propri-
ety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a 
challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.”125 The Court then applied the standard to Hawaii’s 
write-in voting ban. Unlike in Anderson, it concluded that the 
burden placed on petitioner’s rights—although present—was 
not particularly severe.126 Because of the limited nature of the 
burden, it was outweighed by Hawaii’s purported interest in the 
ballot restriction.127 
Although originally limited to ballot access and voting re-
strictions like those in its founding cases, the Anderson-Burdick 
test has been expanded to several other areas of election law. 
Most notably, the standard now applies in cases where parties, as 
opposed to individuals, are asserting their First Amendment as-
sociational rights. The first Supreme Court case to evaluate these 
claims under Anderson-Burdick came in 1997 in Timmons v Twin 
Cities Area New Party.128 The Court considered the New Party’s 
challenge to a Minnesota law prohibiting fusion candidacies—
when a candidate appears on the ballot as the nominee of more 
than one party.129 The New Party contended that the rule 
 
 122 See Burdick, 504 US at 430. 
 123 See id at 433 (“The Constitution provides that States may prescribe ‘[t]he Times, 
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.’”), quoting US 
Const Art I, § 4, cl 1 (alteration in original). 
 124 Burdick, 504 US at 433–34. 
 125 Id at 434. 
 126 See id (acknowledging that Hawaii’s laws clearly “have an impact on the right to 
vote” but stating that “it can hardly be said that the laws . . . unconstitutionally limit ac-
cess to the ballot”). 
 127 See id at 439–40. 
 128 520 US 351 (1997). 
 129 See id at 354. 
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infringed on its associational rights by preventing it from choos-
ing its preferred nominee.130 Applying the Anderson-Burdick 
framework, the Court upheld the law as a legitimate exercise of 
the state’s election-regulation authority.131 
Further cases have applied and expanded the range of the 
balancing test. In Clingman v Beaver,132 the Supreme Court used 
Anderson-Burdick to uphold an Oklahoma law that only allowed 
parties to hold closed or semiclosed primaries.133 Recently, the 
Court has also used the Anderson-Burdick framework to uphold 
laws instituting top-two blanket primaries134 and voter ID laws.135 
Lower courts have even used the framework to evaluate the 
unique voting rights claim that Bush v Gore136 created.137 
Overall, the Anderson-Burdick balancing test has gained 
more traction and widespread use in recent decades in various 
election law contexts. However, there remain several areas of 
election law in which the Court has not applied the Anderson-
Burdick framework, instead applying strict scrutiny or some 
other constitutional standard of review. These include campaign 
finance,138 racial vote dilution,139 racial gerrymandering,140 and, 
 
 130 See id at 355. 
 131 See id at 369–70. 
 132 544 US 581 (2005). 
 133 See id at 586–97. 
 134 See Washington State Grange v Washington State Republican Party, 552 US 442, 
452–58 (2008). A top-two blanket primary consists of a primary election open to candidates 
from all parties as well as independents, in which voters can vote for any candidate. The 
top two vote-getters in the primary move on to face each other in the general election. See 
id at 447–48. 
 135 See Crawford v Marion County Election Board, 553 US 181, 200–03 (2008) (Ste-
vens) (plurality). Voter ID laws—as the name suggests—generally require voters to pro-
duce government-issued identification at a polling place before voting. See id at 185–86. 
 136 531 US 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 137 See Wexler v Anderson, 452 F3d 1226, 1231–33 (11th Cir 2006). Bush was the first 
case to consider an equal protection challenge to the treatment of ballots themselves, instead 
of simply the right to cast a ballot. See Bush, 531 US at 104–10 (finding that the disparate 
treatment of ballots during the 2000 Florida recount denied voters equal protection). 
 138 See Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 25, 44–45 (1976) (per curiam) (applying both 
strict scrutiny and a more intermediate scrutiny to expenditure and contribution limits, 
respectively). 
 139 See City of Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55, 65–68 (1980) (requiring a showing of dis-
criminatory intent to invalidate a law under a constitutional vote dilution challenge). This 
standard is never used, however, because of the statutory standard for evaluating vote 
dilution claims under the amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Thornburg v Gingles, 
479 US 30, 47–51 (1986) (outlining the statutory standard). 
 140 See Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 920 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a redis-
tricting plan where race was the “predominant” explanation for the map). 
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before Rucho, partisan gerrymandering.141 McIntyre v Ohio Elec-
tions Commission142 offers the best explanation the Court has 
given for this divergence. In that case, the Court declined to apply 
the Anderson-Burdick test to an Ohio regulation that prohibited 
the distribution of campaign leaflets without the responsible 
party’s name and address, instead deciding to apply “exacting scru-
tiny.”143 The Court reasoned that the statute was “a regulation of 
pure speech” and not one that controls “the mechanics of the elec-
toral process” like in Anderson or Burdick.144 Looking retroactively, 
this distinction can partially explain why the Anderson-Burdick 
framework has been applied in many cases, like ballot regulations, 
but not in others, like campaign finance. Whereas ballot regula-
tions relate to electoral mechanics, campaign finance regulations 
directly restrict the expression of individuals.145 This distinction 
can help guide an analysis of whether redistricting commissions 
might fall into the current scope of Anderson-Burdick, as discussed 
in the following Part. 
III.  DOCTRINAL ASSESSMENT OF THE APPROPRIATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS 
When faced with future challenges to exclusionary provisions 
of redistricting commissions, courts will have to grapple with 
these competing constitutional standards for evaluating associa-
tional burdens. Facially, the situation has factual similarities to 
the Patronage Cases, which follow general associational-rights 
doctrine and apply strict scrutiny. Classifying redistricting com-
missions as election laws, however, puts Anderson-Burdick in 
play. This dilemma places these provisions of redistricting com-
missions in a limbo of constitutional review. 
This Part assesses the merits of both standards in the redis-
tricting commission context, illustrating how the decision facing 
the courts is a close call. Overall, the Anderson-Burdick balancing 
test has a slight doctrinal edge over strict scrutiny as the appro-
priate methodology for courts to use when handling these claims. 
Several factual and doctrinal distinctions call into question the 
analogy between certain provisions of redistricting commissions 
 
 141 See Davis, 478 US at 132 (outlining the now-defunct standard for evaluating 
whether an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander has occurred). 
 142 514 US 334 (1995). 
 143 See id at 344–47. 
 144 Id at 345. 
 145 See Buckley, 424 US at 19. 
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and the Patronage Cases. Applying the Patronage Cases to redis-
tricting commissions would thus require a doctrinal expansion. 
Anderson-Burdick, on the other hand, has a less restrictive scope 
than the patronage doctrine. Redistricting commissions can easily 
fall into the broad bucket of “election laws” that the Supreme Court 
implicitly acknowledged in Arizona State Legislature, and are more 
similar to election laws for which Anderson-Burdick applies than 
those for which it does not. Part IV supplements this doctrinal as-
sessment with a normative argument about why courts should ap-
ply Anderson-Burdick to redistricting commissions. 
A. Should First Amendment Strict Scrutiny Apply to 
Redistricting Commissions? 
Given the rigor of strict constitutional review, challengers of 
redistricting commissions would likely prefer that courts apply 
strict scrutiny. Taken at a high level of generality, the patronage 
doctrine seems to apply. As articulated in Rutan, “conditioning 
hiring decisions on political belief and association plainly consti-
tutes an unconstitutional condition, unless the government has a 
vital interest in doing so.”146 Almost all redistricting commissions 
with exclusionary provisions prohibit party employees and lead-
ership from becoming commissioners, seemingly discriminating 
against them based on their political associations. Provisions that 
create quotas for a certain number of partisans also implicate the 
Patronage Cases, as they require the government to consider po-
litical affiliation when making hiring decisions. 
Both provisions ostensibly harm the associational rights of 
political parties as well. The exclusionary provisions bar certain 
party members from gaining government positions, and the affil-
iation requirements could infringe on a political party’s right to 
choose its members and nominees for public positions. Consider a 
situation—possible under Michigan’s redistricting commission—
in which a citizen swears under oath their affiliation with the Re-
publican Party and is selected to the commission. That citizen, 
however, is not a Republican, and redistricts according to other 
interests. An associational harm has likely taken place. 
Although these redistricting commission provisions seem 
analogous to the Patronage Cases, when examined more closely, 
there are several distinguishing factors. To apply strict scrutiny 
under the patronage doctrine, courts would need to first answer 
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certain questions, including whether commissioners are employ-
ees of the state; whether commissioners are policymakers; and 
whether the political discrimination here resembles the situa-
tions in the Patronage Cases. This Section attempts to parse out 
the answers to these questions. Overall, applying strict scrutiny 
to the exclusionary provisions of redistricting commissions would 
require an expansion of the existing patronage doctrine. This Sec-
tion then evaluates how the Patronage Cases apply to quota pro-
visions, whose constitutionality will depend more heavily on the 
statutory text. 
1. Whether commissioners are employees of the state. 
As the doctrine currently stands, the holdings of the Patron-
age Cases generally apply only to employment decisions.147 The 
Supreme Court broadened the scope slightly in O’Hare Truck Ser-
vice, Inc v City of Northlake,148 holding that the government can-
not consider political affiliation when making agreements with 
independent contractors absent narrow tailoring toward a com-
pelling state interest.149 If redistricting commissioners are not em-
ployees or independent contractors, courts would have to extend 
the current doctrine to encompass the associational burdens that 
the exclusionary provisions impose. 
None of the commissions that have exclusionary provisions 
expressly classify the commissioners as employees.150 This is not 
terribly surprising; service on a redistricting commission is lim-
ited to the yearlong redistricting cycle, occurring once every ten 
years.151 However, one could classify commissioners as temporary 
employees of the state. After the ruling in O’Hare, some courts 
have indicated that the patronage doctrine also extends to tem-
porary employees.152 
 
 147 See id at 79 (noting that the patronage doctrine extends to “promotion, transfer, 
recall, and hiring decisions based on party affiliation” that involve the government “pres-
suring employees to discontinue the free exercise of their First Amendment rights”) (em-
phasis added). 
 148 518 US 712 (1996). 
 149 See id at 721. 
 150 See, for example, Mich Const Art IV, § 6 (referring to commissioners only as “com-
missioners” or “members”). 
 151 See note 49 and accompanying text. 
 152 See, for example, Tarpley v Jeffers, 96 F3d 921, 927 (7th Cir 1996) (“[A]t least until 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in O’Hare Truck Service, the applicability of Rutan to 
temporary positions was not clearly established.”). 
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The fact that some commissioners receive compensation for 
their service also obfuscates an attempt to distinguish them from 
actual employees. The members of the Michigan redistricting 
commission each receive compensation equal to at least 25 per-
cent of the governor’s salary153—not an insignificant amount of 
money.154 Other commissions have similar compensation provi-
sions155 or allow members to be reimbursed for expenses.156 Com-
missions that do not have compensation provisions, however, 
could make a plausible claim that they do not provide a benefit 
akin to employment. Challengers could respond by arguing that 
serving on the commission itself constitutes a government bene-
fit, even without employment status or compensation. For exam-
ple, it would be difficult to say that an unpaid government intern 
working on Capitol Hill does not receive a “benefit,” even though 
they receive no income. 
Additionally, some commissions prevent current employers 
from terminating employees for missing work for commission du-
ties.157 This may cut both ways, as it puts the commission on an 
even playing field with employment but also allows commission-
ers to keep their current jobs. Overall, even if commission mem-
bers are not considered “employees” under the traditional appli-
cations of the patronage doctrine, it is likely that a court could 
apply the doctrine to commissioners based on their relationship 
with the government. However, this would require an expansion 
of how the courts currently think of government employees. 
2. Whether commissioners are policymakers. 
Even if commissioners are employees, the patronage doctrine 
would not apply if they served a policymaking function. The Pat-
ronage Cases make clear that their holdings—and the strict con-
stitutional review they entail—do not extend to policymaking po-
sitions. The rationale behind this exception is that political hiring 
is often essential to implementing the policy of a new 
 
 153 See Mich Const Art IV, § 6(5). 
 154 As of 2019, the governor of Michigan earned an annual salary of $159,300, guar-
anteeing each commission member compensation of at least $39,825. See Marissa Perino 
and Dominic-Madori Davis, Here’s the Salary of Every Governor in All 50 US States (Busi-
ness Insider, Oct 30, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/29WR-QGN4. 
 155 See, for example, Cal Govt Code § 8253.5 (compensating members of the commis-
sion $300 per day, an amount adjusted once each decade according to changes in the Cal-
ifornia Price Index). 
 156 See, for example, Ariz Const Art IV, Part 2, § 1(21). 
 157 See Mich Const Art IV, § 6(21). 
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administration.158 In drawing the line between standard govern-
ment employees and policymakers, the Supreme Court has held 
that the ultimate inquiry is “whether the hiring authority can 
demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement 
for the effective performance of the public office involved.”159 
Lower courts have struggled with applying this distinction, 
yielding “conflicting and confusing” results.160 In an attempt to 
create more distinct classifications, the Seventh Circuit considers 
a policymaker someone whose employment “involves the making 
of policy and thus the exercise of political judgment or the provi-
sion of political advice to the elected superior, or [whose] job (such 
as speechwriting) [ ] gives the holder access to his political supe-
riors’ confidential, politically sensitive thoughts.”161 The Sixth 
Circuit defines four categories of employees who fall within the 
policymaking exception, one of which is “positions that are part of 
a group of positions filled by balancing out political party repre-
sentation.”162 A potential example of this arrangement is the Fed-
eral Election Commission, which requires 6 members with “[n]o 
more than 3 members . . . affiliated with the same political 
party.”163 
Although no courts have yet considered whether redistricting 
commissioners are policymakers, some have analyzed the policy-
making status of election officials. Applying the formulation from 
the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a county 
election administrator was a policymaker under the patronage 
doctrine.164 In doing so, the court noted the administrator’s signif-
icant discretion in “plans for redistricting, precinct boundaries, 
polling stations, and early voting locations.”165 The court also re-
jected the plaintiff’s argument that the election administration 
position should be apolitical, properly noting that the test is 
 
 158 See Elrod, 427 US at 367 (Brennan) (plurality) (noting that advancing the interest 
of preventing “tactics obstructing the implementation of policies of [a] new administration” 
could be done by “[l]imiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions”). 
 159 Branti, 445 US at 518. 
 160 Jenkins v Medford, 119 F3d 1156, 1160 (4th Cir 1997), quoting Upton v Thompson, 
930 F2d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir 1991). 
 161 Riley v Blagojevich, 425 F3d 357, 359 (7th Cir 2005). 
 162 Peterson v Dean, 777 F3d 334, 352 (6th Cir 2015), citing McCloud v Testa, 97 F3d 
1536, 1557 (6th Cir 1996). 
 163 See 52 USC § 30106(a)(1). 
 164 See Peterson, 777 F3d at 350. 
 165 Id at 347. 
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whether political considerations in employment decisions are ap-
propriate, not essential.166 
Following these circuit precedents does not provide conclu-
sive guidance for analyzing the policymaking status of redistrict-
ing commissioners. In the Sixth Circuit, analogizing redistricting 
commissioners to election administrators could place them within 
the realm of policymakers. They certainly share several of elec-
tion administrators’ discretionary policymaking judgments, most 
notably the authority over “plans for redistricting.”167 Addition-
ally, the Sixth Circuit includes in the policymaking exception en-
tities that require a balance of political affiliations among their 
members, which many commissions require.168 However, consid-
ering commissioners under the Seventh Circuit’s “political judg-
ment” requirement169 could tip the scales the other way. In one 
sense, commissioners create important policy for the state that 
has significant political ramifications: deciding the district lines 
for future elections. Nonetheless, the entire point of the commis-
sions is to be nonpolitical—or to at least minimize political influ-
ence. To argue that choosing members for redistricting commis-
sioners necessitates political considerations conflicts with the 
idea that the commissions are truly independent. If this is the 
case, it is difficult to argue that redistricting commissioners are 
making political judgments, putting them outside the bounds of 
the policymaking exception in the Seventh Circuit. Overall, no 
Supreme Court or circuit precedent bears directly on the policy-
making status of redistricting commissioners, and an answer to 
this question may depend on the jurisdiction in which the case is 
brought. Most likely, resolving this issue in favor of analyzing 
such cases under the patronage doctrine would require a nar-
rower view of the policymaking exception. 
3. Whether redistricting commissions’ exclusionary 
provisions constitute political discrimination under the 
patronage doctrine. 
At the heart of challenges to the redistricting commissions’ 
exclusionary provisions is a more fundamental problem with the 
analogy to the patronage doctrine. The prohibitions on legislators, 
 
 166 See id at 347–48. 
 167 Id at 347. 
 168 See Part I. 
 169 Riley, 425 F3d at 359. 
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party insiders, and lobbyists discriminate against these actors 
differently than the prototypical political patronage practices dis-
criminated against such plaintiffs. In all of the Patronage Cases, 
the plaintiffs suffered adverse employment decisions because of 
their affiliation or nonaffiliation with a particular political party. 
That is to say, Democratic sheriff Elrod fired his employees be-
cause they were not Democrats.170 In the redistricting commission 
context, members are not excluded because they are Republicans 
or Democrats. Instead, the provisions exclude certain groups that 
are most likely to have a conflict of interest in the redistricting pro-
cess, which happens to include actual party employees and legisla-
tors that have a stake in their party’s electoral success. For exam-
ple, the state legislative leaders of both the Republican and 
Democratic Parties cannot serve on Michigan’s commission.171 This 
is not because they are a Republican or a Democrat, but rather be-
cause they likely have a self-interested desire to draw district lines 
to maximize their party’s—or their own—electoral outcomes. 
Because the current scope of the patronage doctrine only ex-
tends to discrimination based on association with a specific polit-
ical group, a decision that applied the Patronage Cases to these 
types of provisions would require an expansion of the doctrine. A 
court would have to say that the patronage doctrine not only ap-
plies to discrimination against a particular political affiliation, 
but also to discrimination against a general political status that 
applies to all affiliations, such as a party employee, chairperson, 
or legislator. The analogy is not impossible to imagine, however. 
Although not targeted toward a single political party, the com-
mission still denies applicants based on their political association. 
Indeed, their association may be even more intense, as they have 
chosen to become an employee of a political party or represent a 
party in a governmental position. Their association with the Re-
publican or Democratic Party may be stronger than that of the 
average worker fired for their political beliefs. Nonetheless, it 
seems like the government decisions targeting a specific political 
party did most of the work in the Patronage Cases. In its decision 
denying a preliminary injunction to the challengers of Michigan’s 
redistricting commission, the Sixth Circuit relied heavily on this 
distinction, finding that the exclusionary provisions barred the 
plaintiffs based on “their associations with professional politics, 
 
 170 See note 92 and accompanying text. 
 171 See Mich Const Art IV, § 6(1)(b). 
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regardless of which party they . . . supported.”172 This does not 
mean that another circuit or the Supreme Court will agree. Still, 
although not unfathomable, courts may be hesitant to apply strict 
scrutiny to this type of political discrimination and expand the 
current scope of the patronage doctrine. 
4. Whether associational claims against quota provisions of 
redistricting commissions could be subject to strict 
scrutiny. 
Based on the distinctions above, applying strict scrutiny to 
the exclusionary provisions of redistricting commissions would 
require an expansion of current patronage doctrine. Other provi-
sions of commissions, however, might be susceptible to this stand-
ard of review under the current doctrine. More specifically, com-
missions that have quotas on the number of Democratic and 
Republican members could face constitutional challenge from in-
dividuals and political parties.173 For example, the California re-
districting commission, consisting of fourteen members, must 
have five members who are registered Republicans, five who are 
registered Democrats, and four who are unaffiliated.174 
Like the exclusionary provisions discussed above, individuals 
could challenge quotas under the patronage doctrine. Recently, 
the Third Circuit struck down a similar provision of the Delaware 
Constitution used for selecting state court judges.175 The provi-
sions of the state constitution required three of the five justices of 
the Delaware Supreme Court to “be of one major political party” 
and the other two to “be of the other major political party,” with 
similar provisions for lower state courts.176 Applying the Patron-
age Cases, the court struck down these provisions as a violation 
of the plaintiff’s associational rights as an Independent Party 
 
 172 Daunt, 956 F3d at 413. 
 173 Political parties could claim that these provisions violate their associational rights 
to choose who represents them in governmental positions. This claim would likely rely on 
Timmons, which recognized the right of political parties to nominate their own candidates, 
see Timmons, 520 US at 359, or party-primary cases like Tashjian v Republican Party of 
Connecticut, 479 US 208 (1986), which recognized the rights of parties to choose who votes 
in their primary elections, see id at 214. However, as discussed in Part II.B, the courts 
have reliably applied Anderson-Burdick in these cases. Unlike claims that invoke the Pat-
ronage Cases, choosing a standard of review for such challenges is not a close call. 
 174 See Cal Const Art XXI, § 2(c)(2). 
 175 See Adams v Governor of Delaware, 922 F3d 166, 176–85 (3d Cir 2019), cert 
granted, Carney v Adams, 140 S Ct 602 (2019). 
 176 See id at 170, quoting Del Const Art IV, § 3. 
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member, as the provisions barred her from serving on the Dela-
ware courts.177 
Redistricting commissions like those in California and Mich-
igan are likely insulated from this type of constitutional chal-
lenge. Although their quotas require certain numbers of Republi-
cans and Democrats, they also call for a quota of unaffiliated 
voters to serve as commissioners.178 This undermines any claim of 
denial of associational rights by an unaffiliated voter like in the 
Delaware case, as they clearly can serve on the commission. Com-
missions would only be vulnerable to such a challenge if their pro-
visions specifically required equal numbers of Democrats and Re-
publicans and left no positions for unaffiliated members.179 As of 
today, no commission has such a provision—although many have 
commissions appointed by the minority and majority leaders in 
the state legislature, essentially ensuring that they will be com-
posed of partisan nominees.180 Any claim under this theory would 
likely turn on the previous distinctions between the Patronage 
Cases and redistricting commissions, including whether the com-
missioners fall into the policymaking exception.181 Thus, as stated 
earlier, applying the Patronage Cases and strict scrutiny to these 
provisions would thus likely require an expansion of the current 
doctrine. 
 
 177 See Adams, 922 F3d at 176–85. The plaintiff in this case was apparently influ-
enced by a law review essay by Joel Edan Friedlander, in which he first suggested that 
Delaware’s judge selection system violates the First Amendment patronage doctrine. See 
id at 172; Joel Edan Friedlander, Is Delaware’s “Other Major Political Party” Really Enti-
tled to Half of Delaware’s Judiciary?, 58 Ariz L Rev 1139, 1153–61 (2016). 
 178 See Cal Const Art XXI, § 2(c)(2) (“The commission shall consist of 14 members . . . 
[including] four who are not registered with either of the two largest political parties in Cal-
ifornia.”); Mich Const Art IV, § 6(2)(f) (“[T]he secretary of state shall randomly draw the 
names of . . . five commissioners from the pool of remaining non-affiliating applicants.”). 
 179 It could be argued that even including quotas for unaffiliated voters could still 
discriminate against them if the quotas are not proportionate to the major parties. For 
example, a commission with seven Democrats, seven Republicans, and one unaffiliated 
voter could potentially still violate unaffiliated voters’ associational rights. No court has 
addressed this question. 
 180 See, for example, Hawaii Const Art IV, § 2 (requiring the minority and majority 
leader in each state legislative house to select two members of the commission each, and 
the eight selected to then select a ninth). 
 181 The Third Circuit held that judges do not fall into the policymaking exception, 
which is why it struck down the Delaware law. See Adams, 922 F3d at 178–81. 
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B. Should the Anderson-Burdick Balancing Test Apply to 
Redistricting Commissions? 
As an alternative to strict scrutiny under the Patronage 
Cases, courts could apply the Anderson-Burdick balancing test to 
associational-rights claims against provisions of redistricting 
commissions. Like the application of the patronage doctrine, ap-
plying this standard would require an expansion of the current 
scope of Anderson-Burdick. Unlike the patronage doctrine, how-
ever, the Anderson-Burdick test is more open-ended and has 
fewer qualifying distinctions that courts would need to resolve to 
apply the standard. The current line of cases provides parallels 
that could justify the application of this standard to redistricting 
commissions. Like other elections laws, redistricting commissions 
pit two constitutional rights against one another: plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment associational rights and states’ rights to determine 
the manner of their elections under the Elections Clause. This 
Section examines these rights and the constitutional justification 
for applying the Anderson-Burdick standard to redistricting com-
missions, and then attempts to place redistricting commissions 
within the current jurisprudence on judicial review of election 
laws. 
1. Whether redistricting commissions fall within the 
constitutional scope of Anderson-Burdick. 
Initially, the Supreme Court indicated only that the Anderson-
Burdick balancing test applied to the somewhat ambiguous cate-
gory of state “[e]lection laws.”182 Broadly speaking, the definition 
of a state election law stems from the Elections Clause of the Con-
stitution, which provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be pre-
scribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”183 Indeed, most 
of the cases within the Supreme Court’s Anderson-Burdick doc-
trine cite this provision as the source of the states’ significant 
power to regulate their elections, despite potential burdens on 
voting and associational rights.184 
 
 182 See Burdick, 504 US at 433. 
 183 US Const Art I, § 4, cl 1. 
 184 See, for example, Burdick, 504 US at 433. Since Burdick, other cases have followed 
suit. See Washington State Grange v Washington State Republican Party, 552 US 442, 451 
(2008); Clingman, 544 US at 586; Timmons, 520 US at 358. 
2020] Litigating the Line Drawers 1877 
 
Common sense indicates that redistricting commissions 
make up part of the larger scheme that regulates the “Places and 
Manner” of elections. By drawing the district lines for state and 
national elections, each commission has an impact on how elec-
tions transpire in their respective states. The Supreme Court im-
plicitly acknowledged this fact in Arizona State Legislature—the 
case that saved redistricting commissions created via ballot initi-
ative.185 The dispute in that case turned on the proper interpreta-
tion of the Elections Clause.186 The Court concluded that the word 
“Legislature” included the people when a state has authorized 
lawmaking through ballot initiatives, giving a citizen-created elec-
tion commission authority to regulate elections and circumvent the 
state legislature.187 This necessarily implied that independent re-
districting commissions fall within the “Times, Places and Manner 
of holding Elections.”188 Although the current Anderson-Burdick 
cases tend to deal with the actual administration of an election—
that is, how ballots and voting operate on Election Day—the ex 
ante nature of redistricting commissions does not remove them 
from the constitutional bounds of election law. Clearly, the com-
mission’s task of reapportioning legislative districts plays an es-
sential part in the administration of elections. Without some sort 
of line drawing mechanism, states would have no districts for can-
didates to run in. Given the breadth of the Elections Clause, re-
districting commissions clearly fall within its scope, and thus, I 
argue, within the scope of Anderson-Burdick. 
2. Whether redistricting commissions fall into the category 
of election laws that can receive Anderson-Burdick 
scrutiny. 
Although the Elections Clause likely includes redistricting 
commissions, several other areas of election law arguably fall into 
this broad constitutional scope, and the courts have so far re-
frained from applying Anderson-Burdick to them. Most notably, 
the Supreme Court has never considered applying sliding-scale 
scrutiny in campaign finance cases.189 In the foundational case 
 
 185 See Arizona State Legislature, 135 S Ct at 2677. 
 186 See id at 2666. 
 187 See id at 2673. 
 188 US Const Art I, § 4, cl 1. 
 189 Scholars, on the other hand, have argued that Anderson-Burdick should apply to 
campaign finance laws. See Noah B. Lindell, Comment, Williams-Yulee and the Anomaly of 
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Buckley v Valeo,190 the Court acknowledged that campaign fi-
nance restrictions can burden political association by limiting a 
person’s ability to donate to the candidate of their choice.191 In-
stead of relying on a standard like Anderson-Burdick, the Court 
applied two higher levels of scrutiny for these sorts of regulations: 
strict scrutiny for expenditure limits192 and a more intermediate 
scrutiny for contribution limits.193 These campaign finance laws—
like redistricting commissions—clearly fall within the broad con-
stitutional scope of the time, places, and manner of elections, as 
they directly regulate electoral campaigns. Of course, the Court 
decided Buckley seven years before the advent of sliding-scale 
scrutiny in Anderson. But even after introducing a different 
standard for election laws, the Court has never considered apply-
ing the more lenient Anderson-Burdick standard, always citing 
the two standards outlined in Buckley.194 
Despite this dilemma in its election law jurisprudence, the 
Court has only made one explicit distinction between cases that 
receive Anderson-Burdick scrutiny and those that do not. In 
McIntyre, the Court refused to apply sliding-scale scrutiny to an 
Ohio law regulating anonymous campaign advertising, specifi-
cally because the law regulated “pure speech” and not “the me-
chanics of the electoral process.”195 Instead, the Court applied “ex-
acting scrutiny.”196 This could explain part of the dichotomy 
 
Campaign Finance Law, 126 Yale L J 1577, 1590–94 (2017) (arguing that applying sliding-
scale scrutiny to campaign finance law would unify existing election law doctrine). 
 190 424 US 1 (1976). 
 191 See id at 22 (“The Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations also impinge on 
protected associational freedoms. Making a contribution, like joining a political party, 
serves to affiliate a person with a candidate.”). 
 192 See id at 44–45 (“[T]he constitutionality of [expenditure limits] turns on whether 
the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applica-
ble to limitations on core First Amendment rights.”). Expenditure limits restrict expendi-
tures made to support a candidate that do not go directly to the campaign, but are instead 
made independently by the donor. 
 193 See id at 25 (“Even a ‘significant interference with protected rights of political as-
sociation’ may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and 
employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational free-
doms.”), quoting Cousins v Wigoda, 419 US 477, 488 (1975). Contribution limits restrict 
money directly contributed to a candidate’s campaign. 
 194 See, for example, Nixon v Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 US 377, 386 
(2000); McCutcheon v Federal Election Commission, 134 S Ct 1434, 1444 (2014). Justice 
Stephen Breyer, however, did cite Anderson—among other cases—to argue for applying a 
balancing test to campaign finance laws in his concurrence in Shrink Missouri. See Shrink 
Missouri, 528 US at 402–03 (Breyer concurring). 
 195 McIntyre, 514 US at 345. 
 196 Id at 347. 
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between campaign finance laws and those election laws that re-
ceive the Anderson-Burdick test, since Buckley acknowledged that 
campaign expenditures constituted “substantial” restrictions on 
“political speech,” rather than simply conduct.197 The Anderson-
Burdick cases, on the other hand, typically deal with regulations 
of elections themselves.198 However, the Court has not revisited 
this distinction between pure speech and electoral mechanics in 
later election law cases. 
Defendants in redistricting commission cases arguing for 
Anderson-Burdick scrutiny would have to justify why their cases 
differ from election law situations that do not apply sliding-scale 
scrutiny. This requires showing why redistricting commissions 
are more akin to the bucket of election laws subject to Anderson-
Burdick than to those like campaign finance laws subject to strict 
scrutiny. Path dependency could explain some of the difference, 
given that the Court decided Buckley a few years prior to Ander-
son. In some respects, the campaign finance regime created in 
Buckley was a precursor to Anderson-Burdick, as it varied the 
level of scrutiny given to contribution and expenditure limits 
based on the perceived associational burden each imposed.199 The 
Anderson-Burdick standard has gained more traction over the 
years as the preeminent constitutional test for election laws, 
while the Buckley framework remains confined to campaign fi-
nance. 
However, defendants will likely also have to convince the 
courts that redistricting commission provisions regulate electoral 
mechanics and not pure speech like in McIntyre, which refused to 
apply Anderson-Burdick to campaign advertising.200 Facially, the 
exclusionary and quota provisions of redistricting commissions do 
not appear to be pure speech in the McIntyre sense. That case 
appeared mostly concerned with direct restrictions on “[d]iscus-
sion of public issues and debate on the qualification of 
 
 197 See Buckley, 424 US at 19. 
 198 See, for example, Burdick, 504 US at 430 (dealing with a ban on write-in voting). 
 199 See Buckley, 424 US at 14–23. One could potentially argue that a court could use 
a more intermediate scrutiny for redistricting commissions, as the Court did for contribu-
tion limits in Buckley. However, this doesn’t have any basis in the doctrine, as the Court 
has not expanded the Buckley framework outside of campaign finance. Moreover, it is 
likely that intermediate scrutiny would function the same as the Anderson-Burdick test 
in this context. See Part V. 
 200 See McIntyre, 514 US at 345. 
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candidates,”201 seeing this as “core political speech.”202 The Su-
preme Court applied exacting scrutiny to restrictions on the abil-
ity to post anonymous campaign flyers,203 a fairly direct political 
speech restriction. Although the Court has not revisited this dis-
tinction, circuit courts have consistently applied McIntyre only to 
direct restrictions on campaign and election speech.204 When a 
regulation triggers more associational-rights aspects of the First 
Amendment, circuit courts have applied Anderson-Burdick.205 
Moreover, redistricting commissions seem to fall nicely into the 
category of those laws that regulate the “mechanics of the elec-
toral process.”206 Redistricting commissions decide the districts in 
which people will vote, perhaps the most fundamental aspect of 
an election outside of voting itself. Disclosure requirements and 
campaign finance laws, on the other hand, regulate political 
speech in the campaigns leading up to elections. At this general 
level, redistricting commissions and their provisions thus fall 
closer to regulations of electoral mechanics than direct re-
strictions on speech. 
Overall, the Supreme Court’s varying treatment of different 
election laws may give courts pause when evaluating redistrict-
ing commissions, but these cases do not bar the application of 
Anderson-Burdick. The trend in the last few decades in the Su-
preme Court’s jurisprudence points toward wider acceptance and 
use of Anderson-Burdick.207 Redistricting commissions fall into 
the broader scope of election laws under the Constitution, and do 
not obviously fall into categories of election laws that receive 
strict scrutiny. In comparison to the strict scrutiny of the Patron-
age Cases, expanding the Anderson-Burdick doctrine to redis-
tricting commissions requires courts to make fewer legal jumps, 
making it a better fit for these new constitutional challenges. 
 
 201 Id at 346, quoting Buckley, 424 US at 14. 
 202 McIntyre, 514 US at 347. 
 203 See id. 
 204 See, for example, 281 Care Committee v Arneson, 766 F3d 774, 784–85 (8th Cir 
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tives warrants strict scrutiny); Federal Election Commission v Public Citizen, 268 F3d 
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Election Campaign Act disclosure requirements). 
 205 See, for example, Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs and Fair Competition v Norris, 782 
F3d 520, 529–34 (9th Cir 2015) (applying Anderson-Burdick to a law that prohibited cor-
porations from being an official proponent of a ballot measure and declining to apply strict 
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IV.  NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR APPLYING ANDERSON-
BURDICK SCRUTINY TO REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS 
With both strict scrutiny and the Anderson-Burdick test poten-
tially justified under existing constitutional doctrine, courts may 
wish to consider normative arguments when deciding which stand-
ard to apply. Several considerations point to applying Anderson-
Burdick to associational-rights claims. Some of these considera-
tions mirror the underlying rationale for the original creation and 
expansion of the standard, and some are unique to redistricting 
commissions. This Part will first present these arguments and then 
respond to critiques regarding the efficacy of Anderson-Burdick in 
achieving these goals. 
A. Parallels to Other Election Laws and the Importance of 
Redistricting Commissions 
The same normative reasons that motivated the creation of 
the flexible Anderson-Burdick standard in the first place justify 
its application to redistricting commissions. The Court acknowl-
edged in Anderson that “there must be a substantial regulation of 
elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, 
rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.”208 Im-
portantly, states must impose restrictions that “protect the integ-
rity and reliability of the electoral process.”209 Pigeonholing every 
election law that imposes some sort of burden on associational 
rights would “tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elec-
tions are operated equitably and efficiently.”210 In these original 
cases, it is clear the Court feared that acknowledging the inci-
dental burdens that election restrictions place on the right to vote 
and associate could undermine electoral stability and make elec-
tions unwieldy and unreliable. As Professor Christopher Elmen-
dorf eloquently puts it, the goal has to be to create “a doctrinal 
framework that empowers lower courts to police abusive electoral 
reforms, while giving legislators plenty of room for constructive 
tinkering and experimentation.”211 The Anderson-Burdick frame-
work remedies this problem by giving courts broad discretion to 
 
 208 Anderson, 460 US at 788, quoting Storer v Brown, 415 US 724, 730 (1974). 
 209 Anderson, 460 US at 788 n 9. 
 210 Burdick, 504 US at 433. 
 211 Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: 
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U Pa L Rev 313, 328–29 (2007). 
1882 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1845 
 
weigh First Amendment burdens against the state’s practical and 
constitutional interests. 
The main goal of redistricting commissions echoes the rea-
sons outlined in Anderson for granting states discretion in creat-
ing election laws: “protect[ing] the integrity and reliability of the 
electoral process.”212 States implement redistricting commissions 
to combat partisan gerrymandering, a practice that can damage 
the political process by entrenching the current party in charge 
and allowing legislators to choose their electorate. Like other elec-
tion laws, provisions that create and organize redistricting com-
missions invariably impose some sort of associational burden. But 
subjecting all of these provisions to strict scrutiny could under-
mine their power to protect the “integrity and reliability”213 of 
elections and ensure that “elections are operated equitably and 
efficiently.”214 Thus, a more flexible standard like the Anderson-
Burdick test guarantees that courts will give them the proper def-
erence that other election laws receive. As Elmendorf suggests, 
sliding-scale scrutiny will still allow courts to police those provi-
sions of redistricting commissions that they consider abusive.215 
But the standard will also allow broad experimentation among 
redistricting commissions—something greatly needed to find the 
optimal way to remove partisan influence from redistricting—
without having to worry about minor associational burdens. 
Importantly, redistricting commissions may be the last best 
hope for addressing partisan gerrymandering. The Rucho deci-
sion has hamstrung efforts by the federal courts to deal with the 
problem. Some state courts have attempted to take up the mantle, 
but state court intervention requires specific language in state 
constitutions, such as Florida’s “Fair Districts Amendment.”216 
The federal government could attempt to alter congressional 
maps ex post based on its power under the Elections Clause,217 
but any direct command by Congress to states to refrain from 
 
 212 Anderson, 460 US at 788 n 9. The Sixth Circuit relied heavily on these normative 
considerations from Anderson in deciding to apply Anderson-Burdick to deny the Daunt 
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. See Daunt, 956 F3d at 407. 
 213 Anderson, 460 US at 788 n 9. 
 214 Burdick, 504 US at 433. 
 215 See Elmendorf, 156 U Pa L Rev at 328–29 (cited in note 211). 
 216 See League of Women Voters of Florida v Detzner, 172 So3d 363, 392–93 (Fla 2015) 
(throwing out Florida’s congressional district map as unconstitutional under Fla Const 
Art III, § 20(a), the Fair Districts Amendment). 
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partisan gerrymandering could raise commandeering issues.218 In 
any event, the legislators in Congress directly benefit from gerry-
mandering and would likely be loath to pass such a law. Even 
some redistricting commissions themselves face other existential 
threats. Justice Kennedy—the swing vote in Arizona State Legis-
lature—retired in 2018, leaving open the possibility of revisiting 
whether citizens can constitutionally create redistricting commis-
sions through ballot initiatives.219 
If there were ever a new election law situation in which to 
apply Anderson-Burdick, this would be it. Without redistricting 
commissions, the integrity of democracy in America could falter. 
Applying an unforgiving standard like strict scrutiny would likely 
lead to courts striking down redistricting commissions. On the 
other hand, courts would probably uphold redistricting commis-
sions under Anderson-Burdick—as discussed in Part V below. 
Given the close call between the competing doctrines, if courts 
recognize the importance of redistricting commissions to electoral 
integrity, they should apply Anderson-Burdick over strict scru-
tiny when evaluating associational-rights claims. 
B. Critiques and Support of Anderson-Burdick 
Of course, Anderson-Burdick is not a perfect standard, and 
it has critics that question its efficacy in protecting voting and 
associational rights. In particular, Demian A. Ordway has criti-
cized the test as confusing and has noted the inconsistent results it 
produces across jurisdictions.220 Although he focused on Anderson-
Burdick’s application to voting rights claims and voter ID laws, 
Ordway highlights that the standard has led to inconsistent con-
clusions when evaluating the severity of burdens.221 He also 
points out that “weighing the burden on the voters against the 
importance of the state interest involves normative judgments” 
 
 218 At a basic level, the anti-commandeering doctrine prevents the federal govern-
ment from forcing states to enact or enforce federal law. See generally New York v United 
States, 505 US 144 (1992). 
 219 A reversal of Arizona State Legislature would eliminate a handful of commissions 
that possess constitutionally challengeable provisions. However, many commissions that 
possess exclusionary provisions were not created via ballot initiative and would not be 
affected by a reversal, thus leaving them open to challenge and necessitating the determi-
nation of a constitutional standard of review. 
 220 See Demian A. Ordway, Disenfranchisement and the Constitution: Finding a Stand-
ard that Works, 82 NYU L Rev 1174, 1191–1208 (2007) (providing examples of inconsistent 
applications of the Anderson-Burdick test and proposing an alternative standard). 
 221 See id at 1192–93 (explaining that Georgia courts found the burden on the right 
to vote of voter ID laws severe, while Indiana courts did not). 
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that will lead to different courts reaching different results with-
out refined consensus.222 Instead of Anderson-Burdick, Ordway 
suggests that courts should apply a modified version of strict scru-
tiny to voting rights claims.223 
Despite being set in the context of voting rights, Ordway’s 
critiques still have bite when evaluating Anderson-Burdick in 
associational-rights cases. Courts and judges have different in-
herent biases and worldviews, and giving them a more flexible 
standard can lead to inconsistent evaluations of the associational 
burdens imposed by certain election laws. In his concurrence in 
the judgment denying a preliminary injunction against the Mich-
igan redistricting commission, Sixth Circuit Judge Chad A. 
Readler echoed many of these critiques. He criticized the major-
ity’s application of Anderson-Burdick, commenting that the 
standard “affords far too much discretion to judges” deciding “sen-
sitive policy-oriented cases.”224 However, any constitutional 
standard requires a certain amount of normative judgment. Even 
if applying strict scrutiny to an associational burden, judges must 
still consider whether the government interests put forward are 
compelling and narrowly tailored. Adding an additional stand-
ard—evaluating the burden imposed—may make the process 
more normative. But the greater deference given to the states’ 
prerogative to ensure free and fair elections outweighs whatever 
inconsistencies this may produce. 
Outside of this main critique, Anderson-Burdick generally 
finds support within election law literature. This is not the first 
piece to suggest an expansion of the Anderson-Burdick framework. 
Other scholars have advocated its application in other contexts, in-
cluding all burdens on political parties’ associational rights,225 par-
tisan gerrymandering claims,226 campaign finance,227 and vote di-
lution claims.228 In particular, Professor Daniel Tokaji—writing 
before Rucho—argued that the balancing test provides the “best 
available standard” for solving partisan gerrymandering 
 
 222 See id at 1197 (emphasis in original). 
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claims,229 an area in which the Supreme Court struggled for dec-
ades to find a workable standard. The growing scholarship on the 
wide applicability of Anderson-Burdick, and its steady growth in 
Supreme Court doctrine over the years, demonstrate its power as 
a useful standard for evaluating various forms of election laws. In 
the aggregate, the scholarship has collectively argued that slid-
ing-scale scrutiny should apply in essentially all election law 
cases, regardless of what specific constitutional right these laws 
impact. Expanding the doctrine to redistricting commissions 
would constitute another incremental gain in an already expand-
ing body of law. 
V.  APPLYING THE ANDERSON-BURDICK STANDARD TO DIFFERENT 
REDISTRICTING COMMISSION PROVISIONS 
After deciding on Anderson-Burdick as the appropriate 
standard for evaluating First Amendment associational-rights 
claims against redistricting commissions, courts will have to ap-
ply the balancing test and weigh the alleged burdens against the 
state’s interest in having these provisions. To review, the rigor of 
the court’s inquiry turns on “the extent to which a challenged reg-
ulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”230 A 
court must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted 
injury” against the “precise interests put forward by the State as 
justifications for the burden imposed.”231 Severe burdens must be 
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, but 
lesser burdens receive more deferential review.232 
Two entities have potential associational claims: political 
parties and individuals. Both groups can challenge the exclu-
sionary provisions of redistricting commissions as well as parti-
san-affiliation quotas for commissioners. However, the associa-
tional-burden theories differ between the entities, and thus 
should be resolved separately. A political party’s first claim would 
attack provisions that have specific quotas for Republicans and 
Democrats serving on the commission, such as Michigan’s provi-
sion requiring four from each party.233 As the theory goes, if this 
provision allows commissioners to self-identify as either Republi-
can or Democrat, it burdens the party’s ability to select its 
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members.234 Individuals could also challenge these provisions, ar-
guing that the quotas exclude certain people based on their polit-
ical affiliation.235 Political parties’ second potential claim relates 
to provisions that exclude certain persons from serving on the 
commission—specifically those barring party insiders and em-
ployees.236 Individuals could claim that these provisions burden 
their rights of political association with those parties.237 Further, 
parties could claim that these provisions exclude their members 
from serving in government, weakening their association. 
A. Evaluating Burdens on Political Parties Under Anderson-
Burdick 
The party associational claim parallels the Supreme Court’s 
application of Anderson-Burdick to other election regulations that 
affect political parties, specifically the regulations on ballots and 
party primaries. These cases can provide guidance for determining 
the severity of the burden on political parties’ associational rights 
that redistricting commissions impose. Parties have an established 
right to designate their “standard bearer[s],” which include their 
nominees for political positions and their delegates to party con-
ventions.238 Their associational rights also protect them from regu-
lations that specifically address the party’s internal affairs.239 How-
ever, the Court has found that bans on fusion candidacies,240 bans 
on open primaries,241 and mandated top-two blanket primaries242 
 
 234 See, for example, Rep Party Complaint at *3 (cited in note 9). 
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do not impose severe restrictions on parties’ associational rights. 
Other cases—although decided before Anderson-Burdick expanded 
to the political-party context—demonstrate the kinds of regula-
tions that impose serious burdens. Direct regulation of party af-
fairs clearly meets this threshold,243 as do mandated semiclosed 
primaries.244 
In the primary-election context specifically, the Court has 
recognized that parties have a right “to determine for themselves 
with whom they will associate.”245 For this reason, a mandated 
semiclosed primary that forces parties to allow independents to 
vote severely burdens this right.246 The argument against quotas 
for self-identified Republicans and Democrats on redistricting 
commissions inverts this right. Instead of the party getting to 
choose who associates with it, the redistricting commissions allow 
citizens to associate with the party without its consent when they 
apply to become a commissioner. In a related sense, the re-
strictions also prevent the party from choosing its so-called stand-
ard bearers on the redistricting commission. 
However, several distinctions show that the associational bur-
den this regulation imposes is not nearly as severe as previously 
considered restrictions. Unlike in the primary context, allowing 
commissioner applications from self-identified Republicans and 
Democrats does not infringe on the party’s ability to choose its rep-
resentatives in an actual election, which the Court describes as 
“the crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may 
be translated into concerted action.”247 And although the provi-
sions curtail the party’s ability to have its own standard bearer 
on the commission, this curtailment falls seriously short of a re-
striction on a party’s ability to nominate its preferred candidate 
in an election. The Sixth Circuit relied heavily on this distinction 
in denying the Michigan Republican Party’s motion for a prelim-
inary injunction, noting that commissioners are not standard 
bearers fighting “for partisan ends.”248 Moreover, the possibility 
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of actual harm is likely slim. Few people would untruthfully 
swear an oath that they affiliated with a political party just to 
undercut the party’s interest on a redistricting commission, espe-
cially given the punishment of perjury. Overall, there is a cogniza-
ble burden on a party’s associational rights in this context, but it 
does not rise to the high level of severity seen in other restrictions. 
B. Evaluating Burdens on Individuals Under Anderson-
Burdick 
The individual claims deal with another aspect of many re-
districting commissions: the bans on legislators, party leaders 
and employees, and lobbyists from becoming commissioners. The 
Supreme Court has long recognized the right to associate with a 
political party of one’s choice, both in the Patronage Cases and its 
Anderson-Burdick jurisprudence.249 From the outset, this right 
potentially only implicates one category within the exclusionary 
provisions: the ban on party leaders and employees. Neither leg-
islators nor public officials nor lobbyists are punished for their 
association with an established political group, such as a political 
party. Although most of those positions are inherently partisan, 
the provisions do not discriminate against these actors based on 
their association with a particular political entity. Claims chal-
lenging the prohibition on party leaders and employees, however, 
could plausibly state that such provisions discriminate against 
persons based on their affiliation with a political party, burdening 
their associational rights. 
Again, turning to previous cases can be useful in articulating 
the severity of this alleged burden. As noted in Anderson, “the 
State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to 
justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.”250 Following 
this principle, the Court classified the state’s early filing deadline 
as a severe burden because it specifically targeted independent 
candidates and voters.251 On the other side of this principle, later 
regulations, such as photo-ID requirements, have been upheld be-
cause they do not explicitly target particular groups. Although the 
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photo-ID laws clearly impose some burden on associational and 
voting rights, they are facially nondiscriminatory.252 
Like the photo-ID laws, banning political leaders, insiders, 
and employees from serving on redistricting commissions is fa-
cially nondiscriminatory. Unlike the early filing deadline in An-
derson, which targeted independent candidates, the redistricting 
commission provisions apply evenhandedly to all political par-
ties.253 Many commissions even require certain numbers of Re-
publicans, Democrats, and unaffiliated voters on the commis-
sion, undercutting a claim that these exclusionary provisions 
target persons based on their affiliation with a specific political 
party.254 This distinguishes these restrictions from strict scrutiny 
under the patronage doctrine,255 and for similar reasons makes any 
associational burden they impose less severe for Anderson-Burdick 
purposes. 
C. Potential State Interests to Justify Redistricting 
Commission Provisions 
Because the redistricting commission provisions likely impose 
a nonnegligible, although not severe, burden on party and individ-
ual associational rights, the state will have to put forward im-
portant regulatory interests to justify them under the Anderson-
Burdick framework. Two important interests come to mind: the 
preservation of the democratic process and the elimination of po-
litical conflicts of interest. Preservation of the democratic process 
has already been recognized as an important state interest in the 
Court’s prior jurisprudence—ironically, in the Patronage 
Cases.256 In Elrod, the Court was quick to note that patronage 
dismissals for nonpolicymaking positions did nothing to preserve 
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the democratic process.257 In the redistricting context, however, 
that interest is particularly compelling. Redistricting commis-
sions protect democracy by preventing entrenchment of the party 
in power and allowing voters to cast meaningful ballots for their 
preferred candidates. Without fair district lines, the power of 
one’s vote becomes weaker, undermining the voter’s ability to par-
ticipate in the democratic process. Eliminating interested actors 
and ensuring partisan balance on redistricting commissions helps 
ensure that districts will be drawn fairly to accomplish these 
goals. 
The Court has not yet considered the elimination of conflicts 
of interest as an important state interest. It has, however, implic-
itly acknowledged the interest in one prior case. In Nevada Com-
mission on Ethics v Carrigan,258 a member of the City Council of 
Sparks, Nevada, sued the Nevada Commission on Ethics, which 
had censured him for failure to recuse himself from a vote for 
which he had a conflict of interest.259 Nevada state statutes re-
quired legislators to recuse themselves from a vote whenever the 
“judgment of a reasonable person in [their] situation would be 
materially affected by . . . [a] commitment in a private capacity to 
the interests of others.”260 In holding that these laws do not impli-
cate First Amendment rights of free speech, the Court looked fa-
vorably on a long history of recusal and conflict-of-interest laws.261 
Inherent in this historical analysis was a recognition that these 
laws serve an important state interest. Prohibiting legislators 
from voting on proposals in which they have a personal stake cre-
ates good governance and fosters public trust. In the same vein, 
eliminating interested parties from serving on redistricting com-
missions builds public trust in the reapportionment process and 
helps ensure equitable districting lines. Taken together, these po-
tential state interests in eliminating conflicts of interest in redis-
tricting and preserving the democratic process likely outweigh 
the burdens on associational rights that certain provisions of re-
districting commissions impose. Consequently, they pass scrutiny 
under the Anderson-Burdick framework. 
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CONCLUSION 
Redistricting commissions and the body of law surrounding 
them are still developing. The number of commissions continues 
to grow, and their various forms in different states show broad 
experimentation. Within the last five years, the Supreme Court 
has saved one redistricting commission (in Arizona State Legisla-
ture) and pointed to such commissions as one of the last bastions 
against partisan gerrymandering (in Rucho). With federal courts 
out of the picture for settling gerrymandering claims, many states 
will likely turn to redistricting commissions to remedy this grow-
ing problem. 
The constitutional claims against the Michigan independent 
redistricting commission in Daunt are unlikely to be the last. As 
indicated, several other commissions across the country share 
similar provisions to those challenged in Michigan. As the 2020 
redistricting cycle approaches, many more of these lawsuits will 
likely arise against other redistricting commissions. Plaintiffs 
will likely attempt to enjoin commissions from carrying out their 
line-drawing functions, placing the redistricting process back in 
the hands of interested state legislatures and ensuring that dis-
tricts remain gerrymandered for another ten years. Furthermore, 
new commissions experimenting with different provisions could 
arise, and these new provisions could also impose associational 
burdens on certain entities, opening them up to constitutional 
challenges as well. 
This Comment is intended to help courts address these 
claims when they arise. The Anderson-Burdick balancing test 
provides the proper standard for evaluating claims against re-
districting commission provisions that burden First Amendment 
associational rights. Not only do redistricting commissions fit 
within Anderson-Burdick’s doctrinal applicability to election 
laws, but the standard also gives courts the flexibility to allow 
proper deference to these commissions and the important inter-
ests they serve. Undoubtedly, other issues will arise as challenges 
to redistricting commissions make their way through the judici-
ary. Such is the case in any novel area of law. As new issues are 
brought and different provisions are challenged, hopefully this 
Comment will provide a starting point for evaluating redistricting 
commissions now and into the future. 
 
